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According to prescriptive decision theories, the generation of options for choice is
a central aspect of decision making. A too narrow representation of the problem
may indeed limit the opportunity to evaluate promising options. However, despite the
theoretical and applied significance of this topic, the cognitive processes underlying option
generation are still unclear. In particular, while a cued recall account of option generation
emphasizes the role of memory and executive control, other theoretical proposals stress
the importance of ideation processes based on various search and thinking processes.
Unfortunately, relevant behavioral evidence on the cognitive processes underlying option
generation is scattered and inconclusive. In order to reach a better understanding, we
carried out an individual-differences study employing a wide array of cognitive predictors,
including measures of episodic memory, semantic memory, cognitive control, and ideation
fluency. The criterion tasks consisted of three different poorly-structured decision-making
scenarios, and the participants were asked to generate options to solve these problems.
The main criterion variable of the study was the number of valid options generated, but
also the diversity and the quality of generated options were examined. The results showed
that option generation fluency and diversity in the context of ill-structured decision making
are supported by ideation ability even after taking into account the effects of individual
differences in several other aspects of cognitive functioning. Thus, ideation processes,
possibly supported by search and thinking processes, seem to contribute to option
generation beyond basic associative memory retrieval. The findings of the study also
indicate that generating more options may have multifaceted consequences for choice,
increasing the quality of the best option generated but decreasing the mean quality of the
options in the generated set.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that a friend asks for your advice. He is a member of a
non-profit organization helping children. Unfortunately, public
funding to the organization was cut and the organization mem-
bers now need to find ways to raise money for supporting their
activities. What would you suggest your friend to do?
This scenario is an example of a real-world decision-making
situation in which the basic elements of the decision problems
(options, evaluation dimensions, probabilities, and outcomes) are
not explicitly specified and more than one valid solution exists.
Following early problem solving research (see e.g., Reitman, 1964;
Goel, 2010) these kinds of problems are considered ill-structured
or only partially structured. In order to make a choice, individuals
need to transform an ill-structured problem into a representa-
tion enabling a choice (e.g., Gettys et al., 1987; Finucane and Lees,
2005; Galotti, 2007). The process of decision structuring includes
different aspects, like the identification of the viable options
(option generation) and evaluation dimensions (attribute iden-
tification), as well as the definition of the potential outcomes and
their associated values and probabilities (e.g., Frisch and Clemen,
1994; Parker and Fischhoff, 2005; Galotti, 2007). In the present
paper, we will focus on option generation, which is a core aspect
of decision structuring (Keller and Ho, 1988; Kalis et al., 2013).
Several scholars in decision making highlighted the impor-
tance of option generation and prescriptively warned about the
perils of relying on a too-narrow problem representation, which
may lead to the neglect of promising options (see e.g., Frisch and
Clemen, 1994; Keeney, 1999; Hammond et al., 2002). However,
decision-making researchers have traditionally spent very limited
effort in the investigation of how problems are structured and
options generated, compared to the effort devoted to the inves-
tigation of how people decide in completely-specified decision
problems (e.g., choices between gambles, intertemporal choices,
multi-attribute problems with full information, experience-based
choices with well-identified alternatives). As a consequence, sev-
eral aspects of option generation are still poorly understood.
Within the stream of studies on option generation in deci-
sion making, summarized in the next sections, the individual
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differences study reported in this paper had two main
aims:
(1) Contribute to the identification of the cognitive processes
underlying option generation, disentangling the role of
ideation processes from the role of relatively more basic
cognitive processes (like associative memory retrieval and
cognitive control);
(2) Contribute to the clarification of the relationships between
option generation fluency, quality of option generation, and
choice quality.
In the next section, we will review the research on option gener-
ation relevant to each of these two goals, in order to provide the
empirical and theoretical background of our work and the ratio-
nale for the hypotheses tested in our individual-differences study.
Then, we will describe our study and its results. Finally, we will
discuss the theoretical and applied implications of the findings,
the limitations of the research, and delineate promising avenues
for future investigation.
COGNITIVE PROCESSES UNDERLYING THE OPTION GENERATION
PROCESS
The first goal of our study was to contribute to the identification
of the cognitive processes underlying option generation through
an individual-differences analysis. The limited number of stud-
ies carried out on option generation observed huge individual
differences in the number of generated options (e.g., Manning
et al., 1980; Engelmann and Gettys, 1985; Gettys et al., 1987).
Some of these studies tried to identify the predictors of these
individual differences in fluency in order to shed light on the pro-
cesses underlying generation. They considered mainly expertise
in the specific domains of investigation (e.g., car troubleshooting,
geographical knowledge), general intelligence, memory, executive
control, and ideation fluency or other measures of creative cogni-
tion. The findings suggest that expertise does not play a significant
role, at least in the majority of investigations (e.g., Mehle, 1982;
Klein et al., 1995, but see Engelmann and Gettys, 1985; Ward
et al., 2011), intelligence, retrieval from long-term memory, and
executive control seem to play some role (Manning et al., 1980;
Channon and Crawford, 1999; Kaiser et al., 2013), while ideation
fluency (i.e., the ability to produce various ideas in response to
some preset requirements), as measured by the alternative uses
test, seems to be an important predictor of performance, at least
in rather complex problems (Manning et al., 1980; Engelmann
and Gettys, 1985)1.
1While the goal of idea generation tasks is to produce ideas not necessarily
linked to potential courses of actions, option generation requires to produce
(even abstract) courses of actions in response to a given decision problem,
usually presented as a more constrained situation (for a detailed discussion see
Kalis et al., 2013). Moreover, while idea generation task in creativity research
generally focus on originality as one criterion for performance evaluation, this
is not the case in option generation, where performance quality is generally
evaluated in reference to utility of the generated courses of actions or to their
effectiveness as solutions for the decision problem. However, both idea gener-
ation and option generation performance may depend, possibly to a different
extent, on memory retrieval and idea generation processes.
However, there are reasons to believe that these conclusions
on the processes underlying option generation are not particu-
larly convincing, thus motivating further studies on this issue.
First, previous studies have adopted rather simple correlational
and single-stage regression methods that did not allow a particu-
larly strict control over the potential relations between predictors.
Second, the rather small number and type of predictors consid-
ered in previous investigations may have neglected some impor-
tant factors. Finally, the findings are not fully consistent across
studies, with some investigations stressing retrieval from long-
term memory and others highlighting the role of ideation fluency
(e.g., Kaiser et al., 2013 vs. Engelmann and Gettys, 1985).
In relation to the last consideration, various theoretical expla-
nations of option generation have been proposed, with a varying
degree of specification. A first class of explanations conceives
generation essentially as a cued recall process, supported by exec-
utive control or working memory (memory-based explanations).
According to this view, option generation is based on the asso-
ciative retrieval of options from long-term memory, triggered
by elements of the problem (Adelman et al., 1995) and proba-
bly bounded by constraints related to the quality of the solution
or to evaluative dimensions and usage contexts (Ratneshwar and
Shocker, 1991; Johnson and Raab, 2003; Kaiser et al., 2013).
Examples are the HyGene (Thomas et al., 2008) and the con-
strained retrieval models (Gettys and Fisher, 1979), with the
former relying on a formal memory model (Dougherty et al.,
1999) and the latter placing more emphasis on executive control
processes orienting memory search. These two models focused
more on hypothesis generation than on option generation, and
they have been applied in rather constrained environments, where
the space of potential options is usually more defined. Another
memory-based account is the Search for Ideas in Associative
Memory model (SIAM), proposed to explain individual idea gen-
eration in group settings (Nijstad et al., 2002; Nijstad and Stroebe,
2006). This model is based onmemory associative retrieval within
a localized set of information (image), leading to trains of seman-
tically associated ideas.When retrieval fails, cognitively controlled
operations are needed to find cues to access a different set of
information (a different image) leading to different trains of
thoughts2. The first hypothesis tested in our study stems from
memory-based explanations of option generation: Individual dif-
ferences in option generation fluency should be explained mainly
by cognitive processes involved in associative cued recall and exec-
utive control, with ideation processes playing a marginal role
or almost completely depending on more basic processes and
thus not contributing further in terms of predictive capacity
(Hypothesis H1a: Memory as Predictor).
A different class of explanations (henceforth, ideation-based
models) conceives generation as a process not only rooted in basic
associative retrieval and executive control but also requiring a sig-
nificant ideation component (Keller and Ho, 1988; Goel, 2010),
possibly supported by more complex search and thought pro-
cesses. The findings of some studies suggest that these additional
2However, this model includes also some ideation components because it
states that generating ideas from the retrieved information may require
knowledge combination, new associations, or knowledge transfer.
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processes are needed to reach a good account of option genera-
tion fluency in less structured and more complex scenarios (e.g.,
Manning et al., 1980; Engelmann andGettys, 1985). The ideation-
based explanations differ in the mechanisms and strategies sup-
posed to underlie idea generation, which range from the concept
of leverage points as seeds for generation (rough ideas or oppor-
tunities leading to insightful outcomes and solutions)(Klein and
Wolf, 1998), to the construct of lateral transformations (qualita-
tive changes in ideation) as opposed to vertical transformations
(more precise specification of a given idea) (Goel, 2010), and to
a variety of strategies that can be used to generate ideas. These
strategies include strategic modulation of activation in associative
memory by focusing on different structural aspect of the problem
(e.g., Keller and Ho, 1988; Keeney, 1994, 1999), ways for avoiding
blocking ideas (e.g., Smith, 2003; Storm and Patel, 2014), ana-
logical reasoning and context or perspective change (e.g., Keller
and Ho, 1988; Ward et al., 1999). The analysis of these views leads
to an alternative hypothesis tested in our study: at least in more
complex and less constrained problems, individual differences
in idea generation should be a significant predictor of individ-
ual differences in option generation fluency, over and beyond
the influence of individual differences in more basic measures of
cognitive ability (Hypothesis H1b: Ideation as Predictor).
Moreover, if option generation, unlike other decision-making
tasks, depends on ideation ability rather than on other cognitive
abilities (like cognitive control, memory, and fluid intelligence),
then we should observe a behavioral dissociation between option
generation performance and performance in other decision-
making tasks relying on the other cognitive abilities but not
requiring an ideative contribution (see also Kaiser et al., 2013).
Thus, in order to allow a further test of the ideation hypothesis, we
included the Applying Decision Rules subtest of the A-DMC bat-
tery (henceforth, ADR; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007) in our study.
Performance in this cognitively intensive decision-making task is
related to individual differences in fluid intelligence (Bruine de
Bruin et al., 2012), working memory (Del Missier et al., 2013),
and executive control (Del Missier et al., 2012), but ADR does
not require any kind of ideation. Thus, if the ideation hypothe-
sis holds true, option generation fluency and ADR performance
should show a behavioral double dissociation, meaning that
ideation fluency will be positively related to option generation
fluency but not to ADR performance, while the other cognitive
measures will be positively related to ADR performance but not
to option generation fluency (Hypothesis H2: Behavioral Double
Dissociation).
FROM OPTION GENERATION FLUENCY TO GENERATION AND CHOICE
QUALITY
The second goal of our study was to contribute to the clarifica-
tion of the relationships among option generation fluency, quality
of option generation, and choice quality. The analysis of exist-
ing studies on option generation quality highlights an apparent
disagreement apparent between scholars postulating that “less is
more” (meaning that generating fewer options leads to a higher
average quality of the option set and to better choices, Johnson
and Raab, 2003) and others stating that “quantity breeds quality”
(meaning that the more options generated, the better the quality
of generated ideas will be—for reviews see e.g., Rietzschel et al.,
2007; Nijstad, 2009) or at least pointing out clear limitations in
typical option generation performance (Mehle, 1982; Gettys et al.,
1987; Klein et al., 1995).
A number of studies carried out in diverse scenarios show
that, despite the relatively small number of options generated by
the “average participant,” at least some good options are usually
reported (e.g., Gettys et al., 1987; Klein et al., 1995). Johnson
and Raab (2003), analyzing action generation in handball play-
ers in a highly time-constrained task, highlighted the less-is-more
effect in option generation, observing that the average quality of
the option set declines with the increase in the number of gen-
erated options. They also showed that option quality tends to
decline with the generation order (see also Klein et al., 1995) and
found that generating and considering more options led to a less
consistent and poorer choice (but see Ward et al., 2011, for con-
trasting findings). These results suggest that less can be more for
the average quality of the option set, and that fast generation of
some good options can be an effective strategy in environments
in which it is critical to trade-off time and completeness of gener-
ation. This may hold also in other benign environments (Gettys
et al., 1987), where a reasonably good or satisfying choice suf-
fices and thus extensive search is not needed. Following this line
of reasoning and related findings, a negative relation between
option generation fluency and the mean quality of generated
options was expected in our study (Hypothesis H3a: Less is More),
together with a positive relationship between the mean quality
of generated options and the quality of choice (Hypothesis H4a:
Mean Choice Quality), because a highermean quality of generated
options structurally allows for a better choice.
On the other hand, several studies showed marked departures
from the optimal generation performance, when optimal perfor-
mance is measured by referring to the options with the highest
utilities in different areas of the option space (e.g., Gettys et al.,
1987). This happens in various domains, like solving a general
parking problem in a campus (Gettys et al., 1987), finding an
accommodation for an impecunious friend (Gettys et al., 1987),
or identifying potential uses for a geographic area (Manning et al.,
1980). Suboptimal generation has also been observed also in
expert mechanics diagnosing automobile malfunctioning (Mehle,
1982) and in experienced chess players (Klein et al., 1995). These
findings have been replicated even when providing very ample
generation time or incentives for the quality or quantity of gener-
ated options (Gettys et al., 1987), suggesting a cognitively-driven
difficulty in figuring out more options3. Thus, a too narrow and
fast generation may not be appropriate in decision contexts in
which making a very good choice is important, time constraints
3This conclusion is strengthened by the observation of similar cognitive
difficulties in accessing alternative options reported in conceptually-related
research on fault trees (e.g., Fischhoff et al., 1978; Russo and Kolzow, 1994),
the predecisional focusing effect (Del Missier et al., 2007), and the part-set
cuing effect in option generation and problem solving (Peynirciog˘lu, 1987;
Del Missier and Terpini, 2009). Participants are also usually overconfident
about the completeness of the option generation performance: They think
they have generated a large fraction of the potential options, even if they have
identified only a limited part of the existing possibilities (Mehle, 1982; Gettys
et al., 1987).
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are not so strict, and the best options may not be so easily acces-
sible due to lower familiarity or problem complexity. Finally,
when the goal of the generation process is to find an original
option (e.g., in marketing/advertising, scientific research, prod-
uct design, art and literature), it is likely that limiting generation
to the first accessible ones will lead to poor outcomes. In these
cases, as studies in the social psychology and creativity arenas have
shown (e.g., Parnes and Meadow, 1959; Diehl and Stroebe, 1987;
Rietzschel et al., 2007), quantity can breed quality and a deeper
and broader exploration of the option space can lead to better
results. Thus, following the quantity-breeds-quality prediction,
the option quality should increase with the number of generated
options (Hypothesis H3b: Quantity Breeds Quality).
However, it can be also hypothesized that the less-is-more and
quantity-breeds-quality co-exist and apply to different aspects
of option generation performance, considering that less-is-more
studies focused mainly on the mean quality variable, while
quantity-breeds-quality investigations focusedmainly on themax
quality variable. Therefore, less-is-more may hold for the mean
quality measure while quantity-breeds-quality effect may apply
to the quality of the best option generated (Hypothesis H3c:
Co-existence of Effects). Finally, as predicted for mean quality, a
positive relation between max quality of generated options and
choice quality can be expected (Hypothesis H4b: Max Choice
Quality), because a higher max quality structurally allows for a
better choice.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were 141 undergraduate students (age: M = 22.74,
SD = 3.24, 26% males). They participated on a voluntary basis.
The APA ethical guidelines were followed in the realization of the
study, with the study protocol approved by the Ethical Committee
of the University of Trieste.
PROCEDURE
The study was carried out in two sessions. In the first one, last-
ing approximately 1 h, participants were tested in small groups.
They received a booklet containing the tasks they had to com-
plete, working individually under the experimenters’ supervision.
They first completed three different ill-structured option genera-
tion problems, generating as many possible options for solving
each one as they could. In particular, the three option gener-
ation tasks required identifying possible options for solving a
parking problem in the center of a middle-size city (after Gettys
et al., 1987), a fund raising problem in a non-profit organiza-
tion helping children, and a domestic energy saving problem
at home (see the next section for a more detailed description).
Written descriptions of these three problems were presented in
sequence in fixed order and participants had 6min for each prob-
lem to write down as many options they could figure out4. The
instructions made clear that a short but precise description of
4This time limit allows a proper assessment of generation performance, while
avoiding extending too much the “empty” period that usually characterizes
the final part of generation or free recall tasks (Harbison et al., 2009). Indeed, a
pre-test and our own previous studies on option generation (e.g., Del Missier
and Terpini, 2009) showed that a large majority of options are generated in
each option was required. Each option had to be written on a
new line of the response sheets following the scenario descrip-
tion. Participants were encouraged to keep searching for potential
options even if they had the impression that they could not find
other solutions. Experimenters timed the tasks. Soon after hav-
ing completed each option generation task, participants chose the
option they considered to be the best one for solving each prob-
lem among the ones they generated. After each option generation
task, participants were asked some general questions about the
task just completed. In particular, following previous studies, they
rated perceived task difficulty, knowledge of and experience in the
domain, and completeness of their performance on 7-point rating
scales.
Following a short pause, participants completed the alternative
uses test (Guilford et al., 1978; Gilhooly et al., 2007), generating
as many alternative uses they could for a brick, a stable, and a tire,
respectively. They were given 3min for each object. After this task,
they completed the six-item version of the Cognitive Reflection
Test (Finucane and Gullion, 2010), and responded to a series of
socio-demographic questions.
The second session of the study took place individually within
3 weeks from the first in a psychology laboratory of the uni-
versity. During that session, participants completed several tests
measuring individual differences in potential predictors of option
generation performance (see next section for a more detailed
description). In particular, they completed three tests of executive
functioning (Letter-Memory, Stroop, Plus-Minus), a cued recall
test of episodic memory, and tests of generation fluency in seman-
tic memory (category and letter fluency). They also completed
a fluid intelligence test (Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices:
SPM) and the ADR subtest of the A-DMC battery. The order
of the tests was as follows: Cued recall test (first session), Letter-
Memory, Stroop, Plus-Minus, Cued recall test (delayed session),
Raven’s SPM, ADR, Letter Fluency, Category Fluency. A short
break was allowed between each task, and a longer pause was
placed approximately in the middle of the testing session, before
Raven’s SPM.
MATERIALS
Option generation tasks and scoring
Participants were first presented with each problem scenario in
a written form and they were asked to generate as many valid
options as they could. As anticipated, the three tasks involved
generating potential options for solving a parking problem in the
center of a middle-size city (after Gettys et al., 1987), a fund rais-
ing problem in a non-profit organization helping children, and
a domestic energy saving problem (see Supplementary Material
for the full text). These tasks are representative examples of ill-
structured decision problems in the context of a study on option
generation (where the general goal of the decision problem is usu-
ally given and the viable options are not). Moreover, these three
problems were similar to the tasks employed by previous studies
the first 3–4min. Given the repeated nature of the task, a prolonged expe-
rience of retrieval failures in the first scenario could have been potentially
stressful and could have negatively affected performance in the subsequent
option generation tasks.
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in the field (e.g., Manning et al., 1980; Engelmann and Gettys,
1985; Gettys et al., 1987). Parking problems affect many European
cities and it seems reasonable to assume that they are relatively
well-known to the population (e.g., Khattak and Polak, 1993),
as well as the more common solutions that are available to pol-
icy makers and city authorities. Moreover, the parking domain
has been used in previous option generation studies (e.g., Gettys
et al., 1987; Adelman et al., 1995), and this allowed capitalizing to
some extent on previous findings and methods. Fund raising in
non-profit organizations is a less familiar domain for most indi-
viduals, and we selected it because we wanted to investigate also
a less common type of problem5. However, all segments of the
adult populations are targets of fund raising initiatives and all seg-
ments of the population (including undergraduates) are active in
different kinds of non-profit organizations (Wilson, 2000). Thus,
it is reasonable that a basic knowledge of this domain was avail-
able to our sample. Finally, energy saving problems represent a
central issue in modern societies and they can be certainly con-
sidered as something relevant for most adult citizens. In this
case, the individual can not only suggest viable options but also
take personal decisions, which can have important consequences
for the individual and the society (Gardner and Stern, 2002;
Abrahamse et al., 2005). Education andmassive media campaigns
in the European Union have provided ample information on
energy saving options in recent years. Thus, even in this case,
it is reasonable to assume that a basic knowledge was available
to the average undergraduate, even if not always accurate (Steg,
2008).
Following previous studies on idea generation (e.g., Diehl
and Stroebe, 1987; Rietzschel et al., 2007) and option generation
(Gettys et al., 1987), responses to each option generation problem
were examined and scored by two judges, and this produced mea-
sures of generation fluency (number of options generated), diver-
sity (number of different response category accessed), and quality
(mean quality of the generated options, higher—max-quality of
the generated options). For what concerns diversity, a measure
capturing the ability to generate options from different areas of
the option space, potential broad response categories (akin to the
“limb” of the option threes in Gettys et al., 1987) were initially
defined starting from previous studies and specific literature on
the domain. In particular, for the parking problem, response cate-
gories were specified by considering the results of previous studies
on option generation (Gettys et al., 1987) in the light of our
specific problem, the parking plans of some medium-size Italian
cities, and scientific and dissemination papers in the transporta-
tion and parking field (e.g., Marsden, 2006). For the fund raising
problem, classifications were initially based on the financial and
5Participants reported to have more experience in the parking vs. the fund
raising domain (t = 4.53, df = 140, p < 0.0001), and to have more experi-
ence in the energy saving vs. the parking domain (t = 4.93, df = 140, p <
0.0001) or the fund raising domain (t = 9.10, df = 140, p < 0.0001). The
same pattern emerged for knowledge (parking vs. fund raising: t = 4.88, df =
140, p < 0.0001; energy saving vs. parking: t = 5.62, df = 140, p < 0.0001;
energy saving vs. fund raising: t = 9.17, df = 140, p < 0.0001). Means on a 7-
point scale for experience were as follows: 3.99 (parking), 3.18 (fund raising),
4.68 (energy saving). Means for knowledge were as follows: 4.11 (parking),
3.39 (fund raising), 4.73 (energy saving).
social budgets of several non-profit children organizations and
humanitarian organizations (e.g., Save the Children). Finally, for
the energy saving problem, the categories were created after the
analysis of scientific and dissemination publications in the energy
saving field (e.g., Gardner and Stern, 2002; Abrahamse et al., 2005;
Coop, 2008). All the categories were then refined and adjusted
after a pilot study. This led to the main response categories for the
parking problem, the fund raising problem, and the energy saving
problem6.
Two raters classified and rated the option generated by partic-
ipants (e.g., Diehl and Stroebe, 1987; Rietzschel et al., 2007; Baas
et al., 2011) after a short training. This included a first phase of
selected readings on each domain (for examples, see the previous
paragraph), and instructions explaining the classification proce-
dure and taxonomies. Then, the raters underwent a classification
supervised training with some examples of answers for each cat-
egory. Then, each rater classified half of the options generated in
each problem (belonging to a randomly selected half of the par-
ticipants). Inappropriate responses (like “I don’t care about this
problem”) or too generic answers (i.e., “Tell the major to solve
the parking problem”) were discarded (less than 2% of the total
responses), and semantically negligible variations of the same
responses (like “build new parkings outside the center” or “build
new parkings in non-central areas”) were considered as the same
item. Raters were then asked to evaluate each generated option on
a 7-point scale (from very low to very high) for its potential utility
in solving effectively the problem (quality). The inter-rater agree-
ment of classifications was very good (K > 0.85 on a random
sample of 20 participants), and the correlation between ratings
for quality of responses was good (r > 0.70 in each problem).
Pairwise average correlations between performance measures
across the three generation scenarios were significant and positive
for fluency (0.46, with the bivariate correlations rpark_fund = 0.35,
rpark_ener = 0.50, and rfund_ener = 0.52, all ps < 0.001) and diver-
sity (0.19, with bivariate correlations rpark_fund = 0.24, p < 0.01,
rpark_ener = 0.19, p < 0.05, but rfund_ener = 0.15, p < 0.10), thus
showing stability of individual differences in option generation
across very different scenarios. The quality measures showed less
stability across problems, with the correlation of the quality of the
best option being significant between the parking and the energy
saving problems only (rpark_ener = 0.17, p < 0.05).
Individual-differences tests
Letter-memory. The letter-memory task measures the ability to
update working memory contents (e.g., Morris and Jones, 1990;
6Categories for the parking problem were: (1) use available parking space
more efficiently, (2) increase available space for parking, (3) reduce demand
for parking, (4) other (including Gettys et al.’s change parking priorities).
Categories for the fund raising problem were: (1) fund raising from citizens,
(2) fund raising from public institutions and organizations, (3) fund raising
from companies, private sector, or nonpublic organizations, (4) investments,
(5) other. Categories for the energy saving problem were: (1) lighting, (2)
appliances, (3) electronic devices and tv, (4) hot water, (5) heating, (6) air
conditioning and cooling, (7) structural interventions (e.g., insulation), (8)
self-production, (9) other. We included self-production of energy to accom-
modate participants’ answers, even if this is not considered as energy saving
(but eventually money saving).
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Miyake et al., 2000). This ability was deemed relevant for our
option generation task, due to the participants’ need of updating
working memory with new cues and retrieved information when
continuing the search for new options. On the contrary, mainte-
nance was not deemed so central because, in our option genera-
tion task, participants had to write down generated options, not
to keep them in mind. However, it is worth noting that updating
measures are generally rather strongly associated with capacity
measures (see e.g., Schmiedek et al., 2009). In the letter-memory
task, letters are presented in the center of the computer screen,
one after another, with the length of the series varying randomly.
At the end of the sequence, a message prompts participants to
report the last three stimulus letters they have seen in the cor-
rect order. Thus, participants have to update working memory
content in order to maintain an updated subset of stimuli. In
our version of the task, following previous investigations (Del
Missier et al., 2010, 2012), 14 series of letters were used, with
the series length varying from 5 to 12 letters, and presented at
the rate of 2 s per item. Two training series were also employed,
to ensure that participants correctly understood the task instruc-
tions. The task was presented electronically using the E-Prime 2.0
software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). We used
as the final score the proportion of triples correctly reported.
Reliability, computed with Cronbach’s alpha, was 0.44.
Stroop. We used a manual-response version of the Stroop task
(Stroop, 1935) to measure the ability to inhibit a prepotent
response (see e.g., Miyake et al., 2000, see Del Missier et al., 2010,
2012). This task was included in our study because the inhibi-
tion of old options or stereotyped responses may be relevant in
option generation. In this task, a set of three words is presented
on the screen in 96 trials, with the central word being colored
(in red/blue/green/yellow) and the lateral ones always printed in
black. In half of the trials the color and the central word are con-
gruent (e.g., the word “red” is printed in red), whereas in the other
half, they are incongruent (e.g., the word “red” is printed in blue).
The two lateral words, printed in black, are two different color
names (red/blue/green/yellow), but only one matches the color
of the central world and the other one is a foil. The participant
has to press a right-side key to indicate that the color of the cen-
tral word corresponds to the color name on the right side of the
screen and a left-side key to indicate that the color corresponds
to the color name on the left side. The task was administered via
an E-Prime 2.0 script, with a feedback-enabled training phase of
six trials. The performance score for this task was the Stroop RT
(difference in mean RT between incongruent trials and congru-
ent trials). Reliability, computed with the split-half (odd-even)
correlation adjusted by the Spearman-Brown prophecy formula,
was 0.76.
Plus-minus. This task measures the ability to shift between tasks
(Jersild, 1927; Spector and Biederman, 1976; Miyake et al., 2000),
which may be relevant in option generation, considering the need
to switch between response categories. In the Plus-Minus task,
the participants have to add three to each of a first series of
30 numbers, and then they subtract three from each of another
series of 30 numbers. Finally, they have to shift between summing
and subtracting three from each of a third series of 30 numbers.
The task score is computed as a shift-cost measure, by taking the
difference between the reaction time (RT) needed to complete
the final alternating series and the mean RT across the first two
series. The plus-minus task was administered twice to our partic-
ipants, using two different series of numbers (Del Missier et al.,
2010, 2012). Before the first administration of each component of
the task, participants underwent a short practice with a reduced
series of numbers. The final score was the average of the shift-cost
measure across the two trials. Reliability, assessed by the correla-
tion between the two alternate trials, was 0.82 (p < 0.001), while
switch cost reliability was 0.41 (p < 0.001).
Paired-associates cued recall test. This task measures the abil-
ity to retrieve items from long-term episodic memory after the
provision of associated cues. We employed a cued recall test
becausememory-based explanations generally assume that a cued
recall process underlies option generation (see Introduction).
In the encoding session of this test, 20 word pairs were pre-
sented, including strong and weak associates (e.g., key-door,
spade-guilty). Stimuli were drawn from the Italian version of
the Wechsler memory scale (Wechsler, 1997). Participants were
asked to learn the word pairs in view of a cued retrieval test (i.e.,
retrieve the second word after being presented with the first). An
E-Prime 2.0 script presented each word pair for 5 s in the cen-
ter of the computer screen, with the order of pairs randomized.
Thirty seconds after the end of the learning session, filled with an
interpolated task, participants completed a first cued recall test.
In this test, the first word of each pair was presented as a cue (in
a different random order, fixed for all participants), asking the
participant to report its paired associate within 5 s. After 30min,
filled with other tests in the battery, participants were tested
again, using a different random order of cues for the delayed
test. Performance in both paired associates tests (immediate and
delayed) was assessed by the number of correctly retrieved words.
Reliability, assessed by the correlation between the immediate and
the delayed versions, was 0.93 (p < 0.001).
Category and letter fluency tests.Verbal fluency tests are semantic
memory test that may also require working memory and execu-
tive control (Rende et al., 2000; Gilhooly et al., 2007; Del Missier
et al., 2013). Their inclusion in our study was motivated by the
fact that these tasks require generation from memory, and thus
verbal fluency tests tap memory processes that may be very simi-
lar to the ones involved in option generation. Following previous
research, our instructions included the indication to avoid pro-
ducing person names (e.g., “S” → Sarah) or minor variations of
the same words (e.g., transportation means → “cars” after hav-
ing previously generated “car”). Before the testing phase, we also
ran two short training sessions, which consisted in generating,
within 1min of time, all the possible words indicating trans-
portation means (category fluency) or beginning with the letter
B (letter fluency). After the practice phase, participants under-
went two category fluency sessions (Animals, Fruits), and two
letter fluency sessions (S, F). Each test session had a time limit
of 2min. Participants’ oral responses were recorded and subse-
quently transcribed. Then, all valid responses were counted, and
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the word count was used as the performance score. Reliabilities,
as measured by the correlations between the two category trials
and two letter trials, were 0.43 (p < 0.001) and 0.71 (p < 0.001),
respectively.
Raven’s standard progressive matrices (SPM). In Raven’s SPM,
a widely used test of fluid intelligence (Raven et al., 2003), par-
ticipants are asked to select, from an array of figures, the one
that completes a given pattern or sequence. This test is related to
cognitively demanding measures of decision-making competence
(e.g., Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Del Missier et al., 2012) and this
motivated its use in our study. Raven’s SPM presents 60 patterns
of increasing difficulty in five series. In the present study, follow-
ing previous research (see e.g., Friedman et al., 2006; Bruine de
Bruin et al., 2007), we used half of the stimuli, randomly selected
within each series (all odd or all even items). This usually allows
achieving a good assessment of fluid intelligence while keeping
shorter the administration time. The performance score was the
number of correct answers. Reliability, assessed with Cronbach’s
alpha, was 0.68.
Applying decision rules (ADR). This A-DMC task (Bruine de
Bruin et al., 2007) assesses the ability to apply accurately deci-
sion rules. It was included as a criterion task to test our behavioral
double dissociation hypothesis (H2), considering that ADR per-
formance is positively related with measures of working memory,
fluid intelligence, and executive control but the task does not
require any form of ideation (see Introduction). Each item of
the task (see Supplementary Material for one example) requires
the participant to select one or more options from a table
displaying five options described on five attributes. The task
presents participants with 10 different multiattribute choices
between DVD players with varying numerical ratings on dif-
ferent features (such as sound quality). For each problem, the
participants are asked to follow a specific decision rule (e.g., lex-
icographic, satisficing), verbally described to them, in order to
select one or more options. Final scores reflect the percentage
of correct responses across items. Cronbach’s alpha for the task
was 0.56.
Cognitive reflection test (CRT). This task was designed to mea-
sure analytical thought ability (Frederick, 2005), which is relevant
in several high-level cognitive tasks. Each item is a mathemat-
ical word problem that triggers an intuitive but wrong answer.
The participants must block that answer and substitute it with a
correct one (Kahneman and Frederick, 2007). The task requires
executive control and numerical competence (Del Missier et al.,
2012). We used the six-item version of the CRT (Finucane and
Gullion, 2010). The overall score was the number of correct
answers across items. Reliability, assessed with Cronbach’s alpha,
was 0.73.
Alternative uses test. The alternative uses test is the more com-
monly used measure of ideation ability (Guilford et al., 1978;
Gilhooly et al., 2007), and it proved to be a good predic-
tor of option generation performance (Manning et al., 1980;
Engelmann and Gettys, 1985). In our application, following
previous studies, participants had to specify as many alternative
uses they could for a brick, a staple, and a tire, with 3min of
time allotted for each object. The task was timed and written
answers had to be provided. Fluency scores for each trial were
obtained by counting the number of alternative responses pro-
duced by participants, which is the main measure used to score
this task. Considering that originality was not a dimension of
interest in our option generation study (see also Footnote 1), we
focused only on fluency scores. The average correlation between
the ideation fluency measures across the three problem scenarios
was 0.53, with the bivariate correlations all positive and significant
(p < 0.001).
OVERVIEW OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
We carried out two sets of analyses, related to the two main
aims of the study. The first set of analyses tested hypothe-
ses on the cognitive processes underlying option generation via
correlations, hierarchical regression, and multiple regression. In
particular, a hierarchical regression was employed to test the
memory vs. ideation hypotheses (H1a vs. H1b) on their capac-
ity to predict option generation fluency and diversity in each of
the three decision-making problems. As a further assessment of
the ideation hypothesis, we also tested, by using multiple regres-
sion, the predicted behavioral double dissociation between ADR
performance and option generation performance (H2).
The second set of analyses tested hypotheses on the rela-
tionships among option generation fluency, quality of option
generation, and choice quality. This was done via correlations and
structural equation modeling. First, for each decision problem,
we computed correlations and partial correlations between flu-
ency/diversity and quality scores as a first comparative test of the
less is more hypothesis (H3a), the quantity breeds quality hypoth-
esis (H3b), and the co-existence of effects hypothesis (H3c). With
the same methods, we also tested the two hypotheses on choice
quality (H4a and H4b). Then, as a more sophisticated test of
hypotheses H3 and H4, we specified and tested a path analysis
model. The model incorporated both less-is-more and quantity-
breeds-quality predictions, as directed relations from fluency to
mean and max quality of generated options, respectively (H3).
It also included the two postulated relations between genera-
tion quality measures and choice quality (H4). Finally, using
path analysis estimates, we assessed the indirect effects of option
generation fluency on choice quality via option generation qual-
ity measures. Specific methodological details are provided before
each analysis.
RESULTS
PREDICTORS OF OPTION GENERATION FLUENCY
For what concerns option generation fluency and diversity, a
descriptive summary of the results is presented in Supplementary
Material (Table 1A). In line with previous studies, the range of
fluency and diversity values shows large individual differences,
thus justifying an individual-differences analysis. Individual per-
formance ranges from the access to just one response category
and the production of two valid options to the generation of
6/7 times more options in almost all (or all) the response cate-
gories. Moreover, in order to account for the observed variation
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in performance across problems, we carried out separate analyses
for each decision problem.
The analysis of Pearson’s bivariate correlations (Table 2A in
Supplementary Material) shows moderate positive correlations
between measures of ideation fluency (i.e., alternative uses test
scores) and measures of option generation fluency and diver-
sity in all the decision problems. Measures of episodic memory,
cognitive control, verbal fluency, fluid intelligence, and analyti-
cal thought are generally not correlated with option generation
fluency and diversity measures, with the exception of the energy
saving problem. Experience and domain knowledge seem to play
some role only in relation to the more familiar energy saving
domain. The correlations with ADR show the opposite pattern:
performance in this task is not significantly related with measures
of ideation fluency but related withmeasures of episodic memory,
cognitive control, verbal fluency, fluid intelligence, and analytical
thought. These findings provide a first support for the ideation
hypothesis (H1b) and a partial support for the behavioral dis-
sociation hypothesis (H2). However, further steps are needed,
considering that the relationship between ideation fluency scores
and option generation measures may depend on the cognitive
process underlying both tasks (for instance, memory and control
processes).
To show that ideation fluency supports option generation
beyondmore basic cognitive measures, we carried out a hierarchi-
cal regression analysis for each problem with option generation
fluency and diversity as criterion variables. In this analysis, we
included in the set of predictors four compound variables made
from the cued recall measures, the category fluency scores, the let-
ter fluency variables, and the ideation fluency scores, respectively.
This was done by transforming the raw measures in standard-
ized scores and by averaging these (unweighted) scores to form a
compound variable for each construct (cued associative memory,
category fluency, letter fluency, and ideation fluency). Then, to
establish a particularly strict test of our hypotheses, we included
in the regression model the verbal fluency compound variables
before the ideation fluency variable. Considering that verbal flu-
ency tests, the alternative uses test, and option generation all
require generation, they may share variance related to common
method or common underlying process. Including into the hier-
archical regression verbal fluency before ideation fluency means
that this common variance will be explained by verbal fluency,
thus allowing a “purer” assessment of the predictive contribu-
tion of ideation fluency to option generation. To the best of
our knowledge, no previous study on individual differences in
option generation applied this strict form of control. Moreover,
the order of other predictors in the hierarchical regression anal-
ysis was chosen in order to carry out the stricter possible test of
the ideation hypothesis, while including, at the same time, more
basic cognitive measures (like executive control and cued recall)
before measures that can depend on them (verbal fluency, and
knowledge/experience).
In the first step of hierarchical regression we entered all
the basic cognitive measures (executive functioning tests, cued
recall compound, Raven’s SPM, CRT), with the exclusion of the
generation-based ones. In the second step we included verbal
fluency compound variables (category and letter fluency). In
the third step, we entered measures of domain knowledge and
experience. In the final and fourth step, we added the ideation
fluency compound variable. The results of hierarchical regres-
sion for option generation fluency are showed in Table 1. Results
for diversity are very similar and thus they are not reported7 .
However, they are available on request.
The results of hierarchical regression show that ideation flu-
ency is the strongest predictor of option generation fluency
(and diversity) and highlight its predictive contribution over
and beyond the contribution of other cognitive factors. This
holds for each of the three problems investigated. However, in
the energy saving problem, a smaller contribution from knowl-
edge/experience and verbal fluency is apparent. Overall, the
regression models explain approximately between 20 and 30%
of the variance in each problem. These findings provide clear
support for the ideation hypothesis (H1b). Disaggregating the
cued recall compound variable from the other basic cogni-
tive measures and entering it in a separate regression step did
not change the pattern of findings. The only minor change
was observed in the energy saving problem, with cued recall
(R2 = 0.024, p = 0.075), verbal fluency (R2 = 0.042, p =
0.059), and knowledge/experience (R2 = 0.062, p = 0.012) all
showing marginally significant or significant effects, but ideation
fluency still contributing more than the sum of these effects
(R2 = 0.168, p < 0.001). The same happened when cued recall
was entered alone in the first regression step (R2 = 0.034, p =
0.032), with ideation fluency still contributing more than the sum
of all the other significant effects (R2 = 0.168, p < 0.001).
As a test of the behavioral double dissociation hypothesis
(H2), we specified alternative regression models in which option
generation performance and ADR scores were selectively pre-
dicted by the ideation fluency compound variable vs. all the other
cognitive measures. The results of these analyses are showed in
Table 2. The multiple regression results for diversity were very
similar and thus they are not reported here. The same holds for a
two-step hierarchical regression carried out in order to control
for common method variance (i.e., the ideation fluency com-
pound variable was entered after the verbal fluency compound
variables). However, these results are available on request.
The findings in Table 2 show a double dissociation between
option generation predictors and ADR predictors in two of the
problems considered (parking and fund raising). In the third
problem, category fluency seems to play a role in option gen-
eration (see also the hierarchical regression results in Table 3),
but the stronger predictor remains ideation fluency. Overall, these
results suggest that ADR and the option generation tasks used in
the present study rely on rather different cognitive processes, with
the former being more based on control, memory, and analyti-
cal reasoning processes (see also Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Del
Missier et al., 2010, 2012, 2013) and the latter being more depen-
dent on ideation skills. Thus, they seem to represent different
facets of decision-making competence.
7In all the three problems investigated, participants who accessed more
response categories also generatedmore options (parking: r = 0.52, fund rais-
ing: r = 0.45, energy saving: r = 0.66; p < 0.001; see also Del Missier and
Terpini, 2009).
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Table 1 | Hierarchical regression results.
Problem Step Predictors R2 R2 F, df, p F
Parking 1 Basic cognitive measuresa 0.019 0.019 F = 0.411, df = 6, 128, p = 0.871
2 Verbal fluency measuresb 0.037 0.018 F = 1.173, df = 2, 126, p = 0.313
3 Knowledge, experience 0.062 0.025 F = 1.676, df = 2, 124, p = 0.191
4 Ideation fluencyc 0.255 0.193 F = 31.778, df = 1, 123, p < 0.001
Fund Raising 1 Basic cognitive measuresa 0.025 0.025 F =0.536, df = 6, 128, p = 0.780
2 Verbal fluency measuresb 0.036 0.011 F = 0.749, df = 2, 126, p = 0.475
3 Knowledge, experience 0.048 0.012 F = 0.764, df = 2, 124, p = 0.468
4 Ideation fluencyc 0.189 0.141 F = 21.443, df = 1, 123, p < 0.001
Energy Saving 1 Basic cognitive measuresa 0.052 0.052 F = 1.167, df = 6, 128, p = 0.328
2 Verbal fluency measuresb 0.094 0.042 F =2.900, df = 2, 126, p = 0.059
3 Knowledge, experience 0.156 0.062 F = 4.550, df = 2, 124, p = 0.012
4 Ideation fluencyc 0.323 0.168 F = 30.525, df = 1, 123, p < 0.001
aBasic cognitive measures: executive functioning tests, cued recall compound variable, Raven’s SPM, CRT.
bVerbal fluency measures: category fluency and letter fluency compound variables.
c Ideation fluency: ideation fluency compound variable.
Table 2 | Multiple regression results.
Criterion Model R2 ANOVA Significant predictors
(standardized coefficients)
Parking
Option generation fluency
Basic cognitive modela 0.037 F(8, 127) = 0.607, p = 0.770 None
Ideation fluency modelb 0.212 F(1, 138) = 37.139, p < 0.001 Ideation fluency 0.460***
Fund raising
Option generation fluency
Basic cognitive modela 0.036 F(8, 127) = 0.592, p = 0.783 None
Ideation fluency modelb 0.144 F(1, 138) = 23.255, p < 0.001 Ideation fluency 0.380***
Energy saving
Option generation fluency
Basic cognitive modela 0.094 F(8, 127) = 1.639, p = 0.120 Category fluency 0.201*
Ideation fluency modelb 0.234 F(1, 138) = 43.448, p < 0.001 Ideation fluency 0.489***
Applying decision rules Basic cognitive modela 0.365 F(8, 127) = 9.144, p < 0.001 Letter memory 0.160* Raven 0.293***
CRT 0.223** Letter fluency 0.142∧
Ideation fluency modelb 0.006 F(1, 138) = 0.755, p = 0.380 Ns
Two-tailed significance levels: ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; ∧p < 0.10.
aBasic cognitive model: executive functioning tests, cued recall compound variable, Raven’s SPM, verbal fluency compound variables, CRT.
bIdeation fluency model: ideation fluency compound variable.
Table 3 | Pairwise bivariate correlations between measures of option generation.
Parking Fund raising Energy saving
Mean quality after Max quality Mean quality after Max quality Mean quality after Max quality
controlling for max quality controlling for max quality controlling for max quality
Fluency −0.18* (−0.13) 0.05 −0.21* (−0.02) 0.27** 0.03 (0.16 ∧ ) 0.31***
Diversity −0.05 (−0.02) 0.04 −30*** (−0.12) 0.22** 0.26** (0.37***) 0.32***
Choice quality 0.30*** (0.42***) 0.36*** 0.28** (0.34***) 0.21* 0.45*** (0.50***) 0.23*
Two-tailed significance levels: ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; ∧p < 0.10. Correlations involving mean quality are partial correlations, after controlling for the
respective max quality ratings. Non-partial pairwise correlations are reported in parentheses.
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RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FLUENCY, OPTION GENERATION QUALITY,
AND CHOICE
Descriptive statistics and 95% confidence intervals for quality
measures, presented in Supplementary Material (Table 3A), show
that participants did a good option generation job in each deci-
sion problem. Clear individual differences in mean and max
quality variables, as seen in range and variability data, justify an
individual-differences analysis.
Table 3 shows Pearson’s bivariate correlations between flu-
ency/diversity and quality measures. Considering that the mean
quality scores include also the rating of the best option gener-
ated, in the case of mean quality we report partial correlations
after controlling for max quality, in order to disentangle the
specific effects of fluency/diversity on mean quality and their
consequences for choice.
The findings fully support the choice quality hypotheses (H4a
and H4b) and they tell us that a better generation fosters bet-
ter choices. A better choice quality seems to be related both to a
higher mean quality of the generated option set (after controlling
for max quality) and to the quality of the best option generated.
There is also evidence compatible with a less is more effect (H3a)
in the parking and fund raising problems and for themean quality
variable. On the other side, the analysis of max quality provides
evidence compatible with a quantity breeds quality view (H3b) in
the fund raising and energy saving problems (but not in the park-
ing problem). To summarize, the overall picture of findings seems
more compatible with a co-existence of effects hypothesis (H3c)
than with the two other hypotheses (H3a and H3b), with negative
correlations between fluency and quality apparent in the mean
quality measures and positive correlations apparent in the max
quality scores, even if some findings in the parking and energy
saving problems are not consistent with H3c. Thus, an appropri-
ate summary of the findings is that higher fluency and diversity
had both positive and negative effects on generated option qual-
ity, with the positive effects seen mainly in the quality of the best
generated option and the negative ones seen in the average qual-
ity of the other options generated in the set, but with these effects
also being moderated by the problem.
Correlations between option generation fluency and choice
quality were all non-significant (parking: r = −0.01; fund rais-
ing: r = 0.08; energy saving: r = 0.14), but Table 3 suggests the
existence of indirect effects of fluency via mean quality or max
quality. Thus, in order to shed further light on the network of
relationships linking option generation fluency, generation qual-
ity, and quality of choice, we estimated these relationships via
path analysis. In particular, starting from H3 and H4, we speci-
fied a path-analysis model and used it for further testing in each
problem. The model includes the relation between fluency and
mean option quality (less is more), the relation between flu-
ency and max quality (quantity breeds quality), the two relations
between the option generation quality measures and choice qual-
ity, and the structural relation between mean and max quality
(Figure 1). The model was estimated in each decision problem by
using the Sepath module of the Statistica 12 software (version 12,
StatSoft Inc., Tulsa, OK), starting from correlation matrices and
using the maximum likelihood method. Model fit is reported in
Table 4.
All the path analysis models showed very good fit indices. The
analysis of standardized coefficients generally agrees with corre-
lational analysis, showing both less is more effects of fluency on
mean quality and quantity breeds quality effects of fluency on
max quality. Moreover, choice quality is positively related with
mean quality in all the problems, and with max quality in the
parking problem. As the final step, we computed the indirect
effects of fluency on choice (Table 5). We tested them via one-
tailed Sobel tests for two-paths effects (Sobel, 1982) and the joint
significance test for the three-paths effect (see e.g., Taylor et al.,
2008).
The findings confirm that, in two of the problems scenarios,
generating more options had a negative indirect effect on choice
quality (less is more), possibly because generating more andmore
options lowers the average quality of the generated option set.
However, at the same time, generating more options increased the
value of the best option in two of the problems (quantity breeds
quality). This means that it may promote the discovery of some
high quality options even if other generated options are not so
good. This may foster a better choice if the decision maker is able
to select the best option. These opposite effects may also occur in
the same problem. However, the indirect effects observed in our
study are of small magnitude.
DISCUSSION
The individual-differences study on option generation reported
in this paper aimed at contributing to the identification of the
cognitive processes underlying option generation and to the clar-
ification of the relationships between option generation fluency,
quality of option generation, and choice quality. We will discuss
our findings in relation to previous research on these two main
issues. Then we will discuss the limitations of our research and
outline future research directions.
PREDICTORS OF OPTION GENERATION AND UNDERLYING PROCESSES
We investigated the cognitive processes underlying option gener-
ation via an individual-differences study that considered a wider
array of cognitive predictors and decision problems than previous
studies. This allowed a more informative analysis that overcame
some of the limits of earlier research. We can summarize the
results of our investigation in two main points.
First, we found that individual differences in ideation ability
contribute to the prediction of option generation fluency and
diversity measures well-beyond the (limited) predictive capacity
of more basic measures of executive control, episodic memory,
semantic memory, fluid intelligence, and knowledge/experience
of the domain. This held in all the decision scenarios we consid-
ered, even if some problem-related variation was apparent, with
memory- and experience-related measure playing a significant
role in the more familiar energy saving scenario. Although the
potential role of ideation fluency has been recognized by some
pioneering studies (Manning et al., 1980; Engelmann and Gettys,
1985), previous investigations had not been able to exclude the
possibility that this influence could be entirely traced back to
more basic processes of associative retrieval, executive control,
or fluid intelligence. Moreover, rather surprisingly, the ideation
component almost disappeared from the research agenda on
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FIGURE 1 | Path analysis model for each problem. Note: Two-tailed significance levels: ∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05. The standard error for each
standardized path coefficient is reported in parentheses.
option generation after these pioneering studies. Thus, our results
represent a step forward in the decision-making literature on
option generation.
Second, our findings showed that the ability to generate more
options andmore varied options in response to poorly-structured
problems appears to be a clearly distinct aspect of decision-
making competence from the ability to apply given choice rules
to well-structured multi-attribute decision problems (see also
Goel, 2010; Kaiser et al., 2013). Although option generation is
usually considered as a distinct facet of decision-making com-
petence by some theories (e.g., Finucane and Lees, 2005—and
a similar argument has been posited in ill-structured problem
solving, see Goel, 2010), no previous behavioral investigations
have been able to provide clear empirical evidence supporting
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Table 4 | Fit for the path analysis model in the three decision
problems.
Model fit indices Parking Fund raising Energy saving
problem problem problem
Chi-square, df, p 0.123, 1, 0.726 1.332, 1, 0.248 0.277, 1, 0.599
RMSR 0.008 0.027 0.013
CFI 1.000 0.996 1.000
RMSEA 0.000 0.048 0.000
APGI 1.000 0.988 1.000
Table 5 | Indirect effects of fluency on choice quality.
Indirect effect Parking Fund raising Energy saving
problem problem problem
Fluency → mean quality →
choice quality
−0.05* −0.06* 0.04
Fluency → max quality →
choice quality
0.01 0.01 0.03
Fluency → max quality →
mean quality → choice
quality
0.01 0.05* 0.05*
Significance level: *p < 0.05.
these theoretical stances. The provision of such evidence is our
second step toward a better understanding of decision-making
skills.
The first theoretical implication of our study is that models
of option generation based only on cued recall seem unable to
explain the pattern of results we obtained and, in particular, to
account for the role of ideation fluency in option generation.
Thus, these models, if applied to the same kinds of realistic and
rather complex scenarios we investigated, need to be extended
to include the influence of more complex thinking and search
processes that people probably use to generate options. Even if
past research provides some hints on these potential processes
and strategies (e.g., Keller and Ho, 1988; Ward et al., 1999;
Smith, 2003; Goel, 2010), their nature is far from being eluci-
dated, and future work should shed more light on them, for
instance by using process tracing methods like concurrent ver-
bal protocols (Goel et al., 2013), smart experimental paradigms
derived from the logic of the process dissociation approach
(Jacoby, 1991), and scaling up existing neuroimaging paradigms
to more complex and realistic decision-making scenarios. This
will require new theoretical efforts and empirical studies, and
it may open a new promising stream of research. In particu-
lar, future research should shed light on the possible interactions
between retrieval and ideation processes, explaining how retrieval
supports ideation and showing what kinds of ideation strategies
are used in different problems and circumstances. Even if there
are reasons and evidence to believe that memory and control pro-
cess may support idea generation (e.g., Gilhooly et al., 2007), our
study shows that ideation process in the context of option gen-
eration cannot be traced back entirely to these relatively more
basic cognitive processes. Amore detailed analysis of thinking and
search processes is thus needed to understand what are the rela-
tions linking more basic retrieval and control processes, thinking
and search strategies involved in ideation, and option generation
outcomes.
Another interesting implication of our study is that the degree
of reliance on associative retrieval or memory recall may depend
on the problem or problem domain. A similar observation seems
to hold for experience and knowledge of the domain. It is likely
that associative processes capitalizing on previous knowledge and
experience suffice to provide good options in familiar prob-
lems (e.g., deciding where to have lunch today in your campus),
while a much greater role is played by the ideation thought pro-
cess when finding out solutions in non-routinary contexts (e.g.,
identifying a valid solution for the non-profit fund raising prob-
lem), but perhaps also in more familiar ones when novelty is
a requirement (e.g., devising an intriguing title for your next
paper). Therefore, another goal of future research may consist
in assessing systematically how variation in the type of prob-
lem, in relation with domain knowledge and experience, affects
the degree to which option generation depends on control and
retrieval processes vs. ideation processes (see also Kaiser et al.,
2013).
A final theoretical aspect is that option generation in less famil-
iar contexts seems to recruit different processes than choice by
description, or choice by experience, where the options are well-
specified. Our findings provide a well-fitting behavioral com-
plement to the proposal of a functional and, possibly, neural
dissociation between processes underlying preliminary option
generation in ill-structured complex decision making and pro-
cesses involved in more structured decision-making processes.
In this regard, option generation can be considered as a differ-
ent facet of decision-making competence, requiring ideation skills
and thought abilities not required in well-structured decision
tasks. This suggests the possibility that other aspects of decision
structuring, for instance attribute identification or generation,
may require similar skills and, more in general, it motivates
efforts aiming at a better theoretical and empirical character-
ization of decision structuring skills. It also supports the idea
that decision-making competence should be better viewed as a
multifold construct, composed of partially distinct abilities that
rely differentially on diverse cognitive and non-cognitive abilities
(Finucane and Lees, 2005; Strough et al., 2011, 2015; Del Missier
et al., 2013, 2015).
On the applied side, our findings suggest the need to design
and validate measures and instruments that can be used to
assess individual differences in option generation, building on
our current work, previous work (e.g., Gettys et al., 1987), and
neuropsychological research (e.g., Channon and Crawford, 1999,
2010; Channon, 2004; Goel et al., 2013). These instruments can
be added to the existing repertoire of decision-making compe-
tence measures (Parker and Fischhoff, 2005; Bruine de Bruin
et al., 2007; Finucane and Gullion, 2010) and they will allow
the assessment of a broader range of decision-making skills.
Existing batteries may be currently missing a central component
of decision-making competence, which may be related to impor-
tant aspects of real-world performance, especially in less familiar
contexts or when solution diversity and novelty are important.
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Moreover, considering the individual’s limitations in option gen-
eration in the more complex and less familiar situations8, espe-
cially if variety is also sought, researchers should devise smart
ways to help the decision makers in these contexts. These helps
may build, for instance, on the power of nominal group gen-
eration (e.g., Gettys et al., 1987; Nijstad, 2009) or on recom-
mendation technologies that capitalize on huge bases of data
about the users and the options in the domain (e.g., Burke et al.,
2011).
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FLUENCY, OPTION GENERATION QUALITY,
AND CHOICE
The analysis of the relationships between option generation flu-
ency and the quality of generated options highlighted both less is
more effects and quantity breeds quality effects, generally related
to different aspects of performance (mean quality and max qual-
ity of generated options, respectively). In this case, however,
the results were not completely consistent across problems. We
also observed that both the mean quality and the max qual-
ity of options in the generated set can affect choice quality, and
that option generation fluency has indirect effects on choice
quality.
For what concerns less-is-more effects, it is interesting to
observe that we found negative relationships between option gen-
eration fluency and mean quality of generated options even in
much less time-constrained problems than the ones in which
these effects were originally found (e.g., Johnson and Raab, 2003).
This shows that less-is-more effects can be observed even in
the absence of strict time constraints, and our analyses con-
firmed that they may have consequences for choice. However,
as already remembered, the effect was modulated by the prob-
lem. Thus, future studies should investigate its generality. A
possibility, suggested by our findings, is that participants may
be less affected by the effect in the more familiar and known
domains, in that experienced individuals may generate a set of
options that are all generally good and thus their mean qual-
ity may not be so strongly affected by moderate variations in
fluency.
At the same time, we also observed quantity-breeds-quality
effects in our study. These effects are generally not an object of
investigation in the option generation research, although they
are usually found in idea generation studies (Diehl and Stroebe,
1987; Rietzschel et al., 2007). Interestingly, the quantity-breeds-
quality effects were observed mainly in relation to the max quality
measure, which suggests the intriguing possibility that less-is-
more and quantity-breeds-quality effects may coexist. This could
8In our study, as well as in previous ones (see e.g., Gettys et al., 1987; Klein
et al., 1995), the “average individual” showed a rather partial generation per-
formance if the whole option space is considered, both in terms of the number
of options and of the number of categories accessed. As in previous studies,
lower bound estimates of option spaces obtained from pooling responses of
the (nominal) group of individual participants (see e.g., Gettys et al., 1987)
indicated a much larger set of possibilities than the options generated by indi-
vidual participants (parking = 122; fund raising = 75; energy saving = 121).
For what concerns diversity, participants missed from 25% to more than 50%
of the response categories, depending on the problem (see Supplementary
Material Table 1A).
contribute to reconcile diverging views in the literature on gen-
eration (e.g., Johnson and Raab, 2003 vs. Gettys et al., 1987;
Diehl and Stroebe, 1987), suggesting that apparently opposite
effects may apply to different facets of performance and, more
generally, unveiling a further relation between studies on option
generation and research on idea generation. However, as we have
observed, these effects show variation across problems, and thus
their influence on choice quality may depend on the problem
at hand. This further motivates a more systematic investiga-
tion of the influence of problem features and decision-maker’s
knowledge.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
We would like to point out some limitations of the current study
that may suggest new directions for future research. First, our
sample was mainly composed of young and educated under-
graduates, and this may have limited the range of individual
differences we observed. Even if the results clearly show that
individual differences are sizable in our sample, carrying out fur-
ther studies on a more heterogeneous and varied sample of the
population will probably show even stronger effects and it will
allow an assessment of the external validity of our findings. As
a related topic, the present investigation could be expanded to
cover the adult life span, thus shedding more light on age-related
changes in option generation (e.g., Del Missier and Terpini,
2009).
A second limitation is related to the set of predictors we
employed. Even if we included a larger and more varied set of
predictors than previous studies, the list is non-exhaustive and
other abilities and personal characteristics potentially relevant
for option generation may be included in future investigations
(such as comprehension skills, different measures of ideation
skills, need for cognition and closure, openness to experience).
Moreover, future studies may consider additional memory mea-
sures, like the ability to inhibit or forget memories and thoughts
(e.g., Storm and Patel, 2014), or free recall tasks that may be better
able to capture individual differences in self-structured retrieval
processes, and even multiple measures for each construct within
a latent variable approach (Miyake et al., 2000; Del Missier et al.,
2012, 2013).
Other limitations are related to the methods employed. Even
if our findings are in line with previous research on similar prob-
lems (Manning et al., 1980; Gettys et al., 1987), and we followed
establishedmethods for this type of study, varying some aspects of
data collection and scoring may be useful to evaluate the robust-
ness of our findings. For instance, it may be worth extending the
time available for generation (although time was already rather
long when compared to some of the previous studies; see e.g.,
Johnson and Raab, 2003; Kaiser et al., 2013). Additionally, it can
be useful to collect also expert ratings of the quality of the gen-
erated options. Although the reliability of our trained raters was
good and Gettys et al. (1987) found nearly identical estimates of
option utility when employing expert and non-expert ratings in a
parking problem, using also experts ratings would strengthen our
findings.
Another potential methodological issue may concern the find-
ings on the mean quality of generated options when the influence
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of the max quality is statistically controlled for. In this case,
after the effect of the best option has been partialed out, this
effect relates to the mean quality of the other options in the set.
Although, in our opinion, this control is needed for a test of
the less-is-more vs. quantity breeds quality effects, it is worth
pointing out that, without this control, no significant correlations
between fluency/diversity and mean quality would have been
observed (see Table 3). Thus, this approach may have boosted the
less-is-more effects.
Another future direction, theoretically interesting, may involve
a systematic manipulation of the familiarity, the complexity, and
the degree of structuring of the decision problems presented.
This may also include the degree of explicit specification of the
goal to be attained (e.g., collecting funds vs. finding solutions
to deal with the funding cut in our initial fundraising example).
Perhaps a more generic specification of the goal may leave even
more room for active structuring and ideation processes. It can be
also worth exploring option generation scenarios in which nov-
elty or originality of solutions are important (i.e., marketing, art
and literature, scientific research). A deeper analysis of the impact
of experience and knowledge of the domain on the option gen-
eration process may also be a direction to follow, as we have
previously pointed out. A systematic manipulation of structural
aspects of the problems will also allow moving from individual
differences methods, which limit the possibility of making causal
inferences, to experimental studies. In this regard, we consider
the present research and its findings as a first significant step in
a direction that may be followed both with individual-difference
and with experimental methods, complemented with behavioral
and neural process-tracing techniques.
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